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Jack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner† 
Abstract 
 
The Limits of International Law received a great deal of criticism when it was 
published in 2005, but it has aged well. The skeptical, social-scientific methodology that it 
recommended has become a normal mode of international law scholarship. And the dominant 
idealistic view of international law that the book criticized is today in shambles, unable to explain 
the turmoil in international politics. This Essay reflects on the book’s reception and corrects 
common misperceptions of its arguments.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Our book, The Limits of International Law1 (Limits), was published fifteen years 
ago. A lot has happened since then, both in international law scholarship, and in 
the world. Here we take a brief retrospective look at Limits, its critics, and the arc 
of international law scholarship and international law since its publication. 
II.  ORIGINS  
The collaboration that resulted in Limits began many years before 
publication, in 1998. That year we wrote A Theory of Customary International Law, 2 
which we published in 1999, and (after revision) incorporated into chapter 1 of 
Limits. The late 1990s was the high-water mark of American exceptionalism and 
optimism about prospects for a benign international liberal order. This optimism 
had seeped into mainstream public international law scholarship, and especially 
American international law scholarship. 
As Limits noted, that scholarship was an improbable combination of idealism 
and doctrinalism.3 The idealism was reflected in the conviction that international 
law was powerful, expanding, and liberal in orientation. The doctrinalism was 
manifest in the traditional lawyerly practice of parsing legal “texts”—treaties, 
judicial decisions, government declarations, and so on—to discern legal 
obligations. The improbability of this combination arose from the tension 
between those texts, associated state practice, and the idealism. The texts tended 
to display either exceedingly narrow compromises hammered out by states that 
jealously guarded their interests, or florid rhetoric that expressed aspirations for a 
better future that most states plainly did not take seriously as binding 
commitments in the here-and-now. Meanwhile, numerous violations of 
international law at the time—and, more frequently, circumventions that revealed 
the narrowness of the actual commitments—were downplayed, explained away, 
or bemoaned. These were the currents of thought that we reacted to, first in the 
1999 article,4 then in two other journal articles,5 and then in the book.6 
Mainstream public international law scholarship of the time had not yet 
caught up with developments in scholarship in American law schools. In the 
 
1  JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). 
2  Eric A. Posner & Jack L. Goldsmith, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 
(1999). 
3  GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 3. 
4  Posner & Goldsmith, supra note 2. 
5  Eric A. Posner & Jack L. Goldsmith, Understanding the Resemblance Between Modern and Traditional 
Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 639 (2000); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Moral 
and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective, 31 J. LEG. STUD. S115 (2002). 
6  GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1.  
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1970s, legal scholarship welcomed influences from other disciplines—including 
economics, history, philosophy, sociology, and psychology. By the 1990s, legal 
scholarship had been transformed. Most influential scholarship became firmly 
grounded in the methodology of the social sciences. While economics was the 
dominant social scientific discipline in and out of law, the transformation was 
broader than that. Legal scholars took from the social sciences a commitment to 
theory and empiricism even while they maintained their traditional normative 
policy orientation, which the social sciences, for the most part, had shunned. 
“Theory” meant that legal scholarship connected its normative claims to a 
recognizable, in-principle-testable theory about how people behave. In law and 
economics, the theory was that people act in an instrumentally rational way, based 
on stable preferences and subject to a budget constraint. “Empiricism” meant that 
legal scholars would look beyond the law as it appears in statutes and judicial 
opinions and evaluate how it influences behavior. In large part, law and economics 
drew on the empirical results in economics. But it also claimed that its normative 
proposals for legal reform would have certain predicted outcomes that could be 
empirically validated. And “normative” meant that legal scholarship made 
proposals for reform or defended existing arrangements. There was a huge 
amount of debate about the appropriate normative criteria.7 While there was not 
as much convergence as one might have hoped, legal scholars did make progress 
by being clearer about their normative assumptions and standards. 
III.  LIMITS  
Limits was a broadside against these prevailing attitudes in international law 
scholarship. In place of the idealism of international law scholarship, we sought 
to approach the topic with the more skeptical style of thinking about institutions 
that we associated with the social science tradition. 
We were not writing on a clean slate. In the field of international trade law, 
law and economics ideas had already made an impact.8 In political science, 
scholars who called themselves “rational institutionalists” (and similar things) had 
begun to apply economic theory to international institutions and law, albeit with 
a focus and approach that were somewhat foreign to the style of legal scholarship.9 
 
7  Law and economics mostly used efficiency as its chief normative criterion. In recent years, scholars 
have become more interested in distributional equity as well. In other areas of law, various other 
normative criteria drawn from political and moral philosophy were common. See Zachary Liscow, 
Redistribution for Realists (Yale L. Sch., Working Paper, Feb. 24, 2021), https://perma.cc/FU4Z-
KDDC. 
8  See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 
(1999). 
9  See, e.g., Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation 
and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 923, (1985); Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane 
& Anne-Marie Slaughter, Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT’L ORG. 385 (2000). 
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Other methodologies in international relations theory were also beginning to 
influence international law scholarship.10 And some international law professors 
had begun to think about ways that law and economics could be imported into 
international law.11 Little of this work focused on big-picture theoretical questions 
about how public international law operated. And little of it focused on the 
incentive-compatibility issue—the issue of how states’ incentives might affect 
their compliance with international law, and hence their design of international 
law. Much of the brouhaha about Limits resulted from our placement of this 
question—which recalled the tradition of realism in international relations—at the 
center of the study of public international law. 
For theory, Limits drew on economics and game theory. While there was 
nothing particularly sophisticated about our approach, we could not simply draw 
on standard law and economics, which was mostly applied to domestic law, 
because of a distinctive feature of international law—namely, decentralized 
enforcement. Because one cannot assume a relatively neutral and reliable central 
enforcer of international law, as one can for domestic law, the incentives of 
enforcers (states) to comply with, as well as make, international law must be 
accounted for. That is why we used the theory of repeated games. The 
requirement that international law be “incentive-compatible”—that is, consistent 
with the interests of states—puts a significant limit on what international law 
could accomplish, compared to domestic law, where centuries of institutional 
development made possible laws and regulations that could advance broader 
conceptions of the public good.12 
The central claim in Limits was that international law—treaties and 
customs—emerges from and is sustained by states acting rationally to maximize 
their interests given their perception of the interests of other states and the 
distribution of state power. This was a self-consciously reductive claim based on 
reductive assumptions. The goal was to see how much of macro behavior related 
to international law could be explained not on the basis of the field’s standard 
assumptions about a tendency toward law compliance, but rather on the basis of 
simple assumptions about state interests and rudimentary tools of game theory. 
In the introduction to Limits we discussed some of our simplifying 
assumptions. While acknowledging that a rational choice theory of international 
law could, in theory, be built based on assessments of the interests of citizens or 
 
10  See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello & Stepan Wood, International Law and 
International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 367 
(1998). 
11  See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 1 (1999); Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Public International Law, (John M. Olin Program in 
L. and Econ., Working Paper No. 216, 2004). 
12  See Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 1791 (2009). 
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domestic institutions, we chose the state as the unit of analysis primarily because 
that is the unit upon which most of international law operates. In doing so, we 
followed mainstream practice in economics and political science, which treated 
states—as well as other collective entities, like corporations, households, political 
parties, and government agencies—as individual agents for purposes of analysis. 
We also acknowledged that a state’s interest—in this context, its preferences over 
international outcomes—was often difficult to discern or contested. Our theory 
assumed that a state’s interest was reflected in the preferences of its leaders. This 
assumption “is a simplification and is far from perfect,” we noted, but we 
embraced it nonetheless “because a state's political leadership, influenced by 
numerous inputs, determines state actions related to international law.”13 
Limits was agnostic about the content of a state’s interest with one important 
exception: we formally excluded a preference for complying with international 
law. We did not claim that leaders and their citizens lack a preference for 
complying with international law. We noted that this was “an empirical question 
that we do not purport to resolve in this book.”14 We excluded this preference 
primarily for methodological reasons. One was that we were exploring how robust 
a theory of international law one could develop without relying on this prevailing 
dogma. Second, as we noted, it “[i]s unenlightening to explain international law 
compliance in terms of a preference for complying with international law,” which 
tells one “nothing interesting about when and why states act consistently with 
international law and provides no basis for understanding variation in, and 
violation of, international law.”15 
On these assumptions, we crafted a theory that sought to explain the 
behaviors associated with international law. Here is the theory in a nutshell: 
International law refers to equilibrium outcomes in games of cooperation and 
coordination among rational, self-interested states. In some cases, these 
outcomes emerge in a decentralized way as states act in reciprocal fashion in 
order to obtain mutual gains. “Customary international law” is the term used 
to refer to the resulting rules of behavior. Because decentralized norms are 
often ambiguous, states also either codify customary international law in 
treaties or draft treaties to address novel problems that customary 
international law does not address. International law can be, and often is, 
effective and stable because once cooperation begins, it is in the rational self-
interest of states to maintain it. But international law can be, and often is, 
violated, as the relative power of states changes, the preferences of states 
change, and new problems arise. Often violations are avoided as states 
anticipate them and renegotiate their obligations; at other times, they occur, 
sometimes on massive scale. International law may be normatively desirable 
for the simple reason that it facilitates mutual gains across states. But it need 
 
13  GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 6. 
14  Id. at 10. 
15  Id. 
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not be: states frequently act in predatory fashion, and can use international 
law to entrench normatively undesirable outcomes.16 
Parts I and II of Limits applied this framework to various rules of customary 
international law and various treaty and related regimes. We made several general 
claims, including: bilateral cooperation was more robust than multilateral 
cooperation; seeming multilateral cooperation in multilateral treaty organizations 
was best understood as a combination of coordination and pairwise cooperation; 
customary international law is more fragile than treaties; and ratification 
procedures can facilitate cooperation. We did our best to use qualitative empirical 
evidence to support our theoretical claims, or to show how they could be 
supported. 
With respect to normative issues, we imported the efficiency criterion of law 
and economics while expressing skepticism toward the traditional normative 
commitments of mainstream international law scholarship. We took seriously the 
diversity of populations (and thus interests) across states rather than assume that 
deep down, everyone is an American liberal or a European social democrat. We 
also made two normative claims extraneous to law and economics: first, that states 
have no moral obligation to comply with international law contrary to their 
interests; and second, that the cosmopolitan claim that states have a duty to craft 
international law on the basis of global rather than state welfare was incompatible 
with cosmopolitans’ commitment to liberal democracy, which is designed to serve 
the interests of its citizens and almost always produces a self-interested (that is, 
nationalist) foreign policy.17 
IV.  CRITICISMS AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP  
In the fifteen years since its publication, Limits has been widely discussed 
and loudly criticized. During the same period, international law scholarship 
changed quite a lot—in the direction of the commitments made in Limits. Here 
we focus on three major criticisms of Limits that relate to the changes in 
scholarship during the period. 
A.  Challenges to Theory 
We noted at the outset of Limits that “[o]ur approach falls closer to the 
political science international relations tradition, and in particular to [rational 
choice] institutionalism, than to the mainstream international law scholarship 
tradition.”18 Indeed, political scientists and economists were unperturbed by the 
 
16  See id. at 4. 
17  See id. at 185–224. 
18  GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 16. 
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claims in the book. Lacking any interest in controversies among international 
lawyers, they saw little that was bothersome.19 
But most legal scholars viewed the book with hostility as a radical and 
unhelpful departure from prior scholarship, and as flawed on many grounds.20 
Some of our critics didn’t like the rational choice framework of Limits and 
dismissed it out of hand.21 Others accepted the framework, at least for purposes 
of argument, but criticized our application of it. Some claimed that the state was 
the wrong or incomplete unit of analysis.22 Others stated that more complicated 
models would produce different and better explanations.23 Yet others said that 
that our concept of state interest was too narrow, or too reductive, or too 
flexible.24 Some argued that we used an impoverished notion of reputation in our 
models.25 Many did not like our argument that states lacked a moral obligation to 
comply with international law or to take cosmopolitan action.26 
 
19  See, e.g., Stacie Goddard, Book Review, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 710, 711 (2005) (“[A]lthough political 
scientists may be sympathetic to the study, most will find the argument of limited added utility.”); 
cf. G. John Ikenberry, Book Review, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 150 (2005) (“This elegantly argued book . . . 
has the virtues and liabilities of all simple rationalist theories.”); Todd Sandler, Treaties: Strategic 
Considerations, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 155, 156 (2008) (“extend[ing] and modify[ing]” the “interesting 
and useful approach” to international law in Limits). 
20  There were exceptions. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Remarks by an Idealist on the Realism of the Limits 
of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 253 (2006); David Gray, Rule-Skepticism, “Strategery,” 
and the Limits of International Law, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 563 (2006). 
21  See, e.g., MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE POWER & PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSIGHTS 
FROM THE THEORY & PRACTICE OF ENFORCEMENT (2008). 
22  See, e.g., Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Book Review, 19 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 106 (2005); David Sloss, Do 
International Norms Influence State Behavior?, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 159, 207 (2006); Kal 
Raustiala, Refining The Limits of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 423, 430–34 (2006); 
Peter J. Spiro, A Negative Proof of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 454 (2006). 
23  See, e.g., ANDREA BIANCHI, INTERNATIONAL LAW THEORIES: AN INQUIRY INTO DIFFERENT WAYS 
OF THINKING 274–75 (2017); Andreas L. Paulus, Potential and Limits of the Economic Analysis of 
International Law: A View from Public International Law, 165 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 170, 176 
(2009); Anne van Aaken, To Do Away with International Law? Some Limits to ‘The Limits of 
International Law,’ 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 289, 291 (2006). 
24  See, e.g., Paulus, supra note 23, at 172; David Golove, Leaving Customary International Law Where It Is: 
Goldsmith and Posner’s The Limits of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 339 (2006); Sloss, 
supra note 22; Edward T. Swaine, Restoring (And Risking) Interest in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 259 (2006); Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revisionism in International 
Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1406 (2006); Paul Berman, Review Essay: Seeing Beyond the Limits of International 
Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1265 (2006). 
25  See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Reputation and International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 379 (2006). 
26  See, e.g., Allen Buchanan, Democracy and the Commitment to International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 305, 309 (2006). 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 118 Vol. 22 No. 1 
We anticipated these criticisms in the book,27 and addressed them further in 
a subsequent essay.28 Many of the criticisms were reasonable; others were 
misplaced. A lot of criticisms were generic attacks on the methodology of social 
science. We won’t reiterate these points here, except to make two general 
comments. 
First, our models were self-consciously reductive and simplifying about the 
influences on state behavior related to international law. The aim was to try to 
understand how much of international law can be explained in a rigorous way 
based on the centuries-old view that states act on the international stage on the 
basis of what the state or its leaders see as what is best for the state. Any theory 
must trade off the accuracy of its assumptions in order to achieve possible 
explanation. This is standard social science. Many social science-influenced 
theories since Limits have made these tradeoffs in different ways. None, we think, 
offer as powerful an account of how international law works with such simple 
premises. But it is hard to compare different theoretical frameworks with different 
theoretical and empirical focuses. 
Second, international law has now definitively taken the social science turn. 
As we noted in 2006, Limits was at the broadest level different from the vast 
majority of international law theory that preceded it along six dimensions: (1) it 
made its assumptions explicit; (2) it addressed the limitations and criticisms of its 
assumptions; (3) it separated out positive from normative analysis; (4) it framed 
its claims as testable hypotheses; (5) it addressed alternate hypotheses and made 
an effort to weigh the evidence; and (6) it chose its case studies and other evidence 
carefully.29 We “welcomed” the criticisms of Limits from within the social science 
paradigm because we believed they portended improved “standards of analysis” 
in international law scholarship. “If international law scholarship generally . . . 
comes to embrace the standards of methodological and empirical care that the 
critics demand of Limits,” we wrote, “the discipline would be significantly 
improved.”30 This, in a nutshell, is what happened in the field in the intervening 
fifteen years. 
 
27  GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 23–44. 
28  Jack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The New International Law Scholarship, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
463 (2006). 
29  Id. at 466. 
30  Id. 
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B.  The Real ity of International Law  
A major criticism of Limits was its supposed claim (or implication) that 
international law didn’t matter, was irrelevant, or didn’t exist.31 Many people 
argued that the theory in Limits was incompatible with the existence of so much 
international law, and with the state’s use of international law in international 
relations.32 
It is true that the book has a self-consciously skeptical tone about 
international law (more about which below), and this is likely what misled or 
angered some readers. But the book is not skeptical about international law in the 
sense of arguing that it is a fiction or unimportant, as some realists in the political 
science tradition claim,33 or that international law is not “law,” as some 
philosophers have argued.34 We were (and are) not realists as that term is 
commonly understood by political scientists in international relations theory, who 
believe that international law has no or little importance—though some influential 
realists, like Hans Morgenthau, did take international law seriously—largely 
because their focus has been on broad questions of international structure and 
stability rather than how states cooperate over trade, migration, and related 
matters. The book’s second sentence described the claim that international law is 
not “really” law as “misleading.”35 Limits is skeptical about the claims made by 
international law scholars about international law, not about international law itself. 
Above all, as noted, the book is skeptical about the methodological value of an 
assumption that states experience “compliance pull.”36 
Yet Limits asserted a robust role for international law, and for international 
law negotiations, in fostering international coordination and cooperation (and in 
avoiding losses from a lack of available coordination or cooperation).37 The terms 
of a treaty, or of a rule of customary international law, matter quite a lot to whether 
and how coordination and cooperation are achieved. The book sought to show 
through theoretical argument and case studies how the behaviors associated with 
 
31  See, e.g., JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 117 (2008); 
JOHN F. MURPHY, THE EVOLVING DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: HARD CHOICES FOR THE 
WORLD COMMUNITY 3 (2010); Berman, supra note 24. 
32  See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, International Law in Black and White, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 285, 287 
(2006); Raustiala, supra note 22, at 429; Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in 
International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2012). 
33  See generally John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institution, 19 INT’L SEC. 5 (1995). 
34  See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 260 (1832). 
35  GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 3. 
36  Id. at 13. 
37  We emphasized that it did not follow that “international law is irrelevant or unimportant or in some 
sense unreal,” and indeed that international law “can play an important role in helping states achieve 
mutually beneficial outcomes.” Id.  
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international law (including state behaviors consistent with international law) 
could be explained based on simple premises that did not require reliance on non-
instrumental factors. And while we did take an instrumental approach to the 
question of compliance, and thus accounted for when international law violations 
took place, especially with respect to ambitious multilateral treaties, these 
arguments would be meaningless if our thesis had been that international law is a 
fiction. 
We were not surprised by the sharp reaction to our rational choice approach 
because it flew so sharply in the face of the standard orientation of the field at the 
time. But we were surprised that some of the early critics questioned whether the 
non-instrumental accounts of international law that we targeted even warranted a 
response, and that none of them—or later critics—gave these non-instrumental 
accounts a robust defense.38 We speculated at the time that “a major generational 
change is underway” in which younger scholars (then) of international law had 
witnessed the power of political science and economics to bring “fruitful insights 
to international relations,” and had begun to pay “greater attention to the social 
science virtues: methodological self-consciousness, empiricism, and theoretical 
rigor.”39 
And this is what has happened since. A trend that was picking up steam 
before Limits was conceived, and that we drew on in part, is now the dominant 
approach in international law scholarship. There has been a huge outpouring of 
international law scholarship grounded in economics and game theory,40 and in 
other disciplines as well, including sociology and psychology.41 But the most 
remarkable transformation has come in the application of serious empirical 
analysis of international law. 
C. Empirical Work 
Limits was mainly a theoretical and methodological book, but it backed its 
claims with some case studies as well as some quantitative work in economics and 
political science relating to trade and human rights. The case studies on customary 
 
38  See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 28, at 464. 
39  Id. 
40  See, e.g., ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 
(2007); EUGENE KONTOROVICH & FRANCESCO PARISI, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2016); ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT 
THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006); ERIC A. POSNER & ALAN O. 
SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013). 
41  See, e.g., Tomer Broude, Behavioral International Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1099 (2015); Ryan Goodman 
& Derek Jink, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 
621 (2004); Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International 
Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252 (2011). 
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international law attracted criticism,42 and the published studies that we drew on 
were vulnerable to various methodological challenges. 
Since we wrote our book, there has been an explosion of quantitative 
empirical work on international law. In part this has resulted from the 
accumulation of publicly available data sets made possible by the internet and 
other technological developments and by the development of software and other 
tools that have made it easier to analyze this data. Relatedly, PhDs in the social 
sciences have increasingly moved toward empirical methods because the 
intellectual payoffs seem high. These developments have had a large impact on 
social science scholarship, and that impact has spilled over into international law 
scholarship. 
In 2017, Gregory Shaffer and Tom Ginsburg wrote a 47-page paper 
describing those developments.43 One can now find empirical work on 
compliance and related aspects of international law in a variety of subfields, 
including human rights, international trade, bilateral investment treaties, 
migration, use of force, customary international law, international courts, and 
international non-judicial organizations.44 This work has benefited from 
collaborations between political scientists like Beth Simmons and Erik Voeten and 
law professors.45 In recent years, law professors with empirical training have made 
contributions on their own. Thanks to this empirical work, the role of 
international law in international relations is clearer than it used to be. The work 
has gone beyond the earlier issue of compliance and shed light on how 
international institutions work, how states design treaties, and much else.46 
This empirical work has focused on discrete treaties or international law 
regimes and has not tested general theories of international law—a difficult task, 
 
42  See, e.g., Golove, supra note 24. 
43  Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 32, at 1. 
44  See, e.g., Vera Shikhelman, Geography, Politics and Culture in the United Nations Human Rights Committee, 
28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 845 (2017); Weijia Rao, Domestic Politics and Settlement in Investor-State Arbitration 
(George Mason L. and Econ. Research Paper No. 21-01, 2020); Cree Jones, Do Legal Remedies 
Promote Investment? New Evidence from a Natural Experiment in the Investment Treaty Network (Univ. of 
Chicago PhD Dissertation 2017); Cree Jones & Weijia Rao, Sticky BITs, 61 HARV. INT’L L.J. 357 
(2020); Adam S. Chilton & Eric A. Posner, Why Countries Sign Bilateral Labor Agreements, 47 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 545 (2018); Anu Bradford, Adam Chilton, Katerina Linos & Alexander Weaver, The Global 
Dominance of European Competition Law Over American Antitrust Law, 16 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
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to be sure. And in general, theorizing about international law has waned in the last 
decade or so. This decline in theory followed and reflected trends elsewhere in 
law and economics, and economics proper, as the incremental intellectual gains 
from further refining existing theories diminished and empirical questions became 
more interesting and pressing. 
V.  SKEPTICISM AND RECENT HISTORY  
We think that sharp reaction to Limits mainly resulted from its commitment 
to understanding international law as a function of national interest and the 
distribution of power. While the critics who claimed that we argued that 
international law does not exist were wrong, they no doubt picked up on a strong 
skeptical subtext about international law and international law scholarship. That 
subtext includes skepticism about: 
1. The extent to which the norms of international law persist when 
nations’ interests or relative power changes; 
2. The strength of international law, or the capacity of decentralized 
enforcement to constrain states, especially powerful states; 
3. The robustness of multilateral cooperation via international law, as 
opposed to bilateral treaty-making, and relatedly, the capacity of 
international law to resolve major collective action problems as 
opposed to bilateral disputes like border disagreements; 
4. The neutrality and effectiveness of international organizations; 
5. The reality of sovereign equality; 
6. The normative importance of international law in the abstract, as 
opposed to specific international legal regimes which, we argued, must 
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis; 
7. The Whig-style progressive histories of international law, and 
especially human rights law, which assumed that international law 
inevitably expands and improves; 
8. The claim that international law is necessary for international 
cooperation; and 
9. The claim (more common among American academics than foreign 
academics) that the U.S. plays an essential role in advancing 
international law. 
This skepticism contrasted sharply with the dominant view of international 
law at the time, which, as we noted earlier, saw international law as approximating 
or approaching a domestic legal system in advanced countries.47 That view saw 
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international law as increasingly universal (rather than bilateral), robust (rather 
than fragile), taken for granted (rather than open to question), constitutionally 
grounded (rather than subject to renegotiation), and teleological (rather than a 
reflection of temporary political arrangements in the international plane). The 
fifteen years since Limits was published have borne out our skepticism. 
In fact, international law moves in cycles, with periods of enthusiasm and 
advance followed by periods of decay and retrenchment. A gradual but real 
development in international law and institutions in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, and the early twentieth century, collapsed with World War I. 
The League of Nations was followed by fascism and World War II. Another burst 
of international law-making saw the creation of the United Nations, the seeds of 
the human rights treaty regime, and the development of security, economic, and 
financial institutions mainly in the West, but gave way to the Cold War. The post-
Cold War enthusiasm for international law has now collapsed as well. This 
collapse can be traced through a series of crises that began twenty years ago and 
that are now wearisomely familiar: the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which flowered into 
an ongoing conflict between the West and Al Qaeda and other violent Islamic 
organizations, and a war in Afghanistan that has not yet ended; the Iraq War that 
began in 2003, that has also not really ended, but rather has extended in various 
ways to Syria and Iran; the financial crises that began in 2008; the ensuing global 
recession; the European debt crisis that reached its peak in 2010 and 2011; the 
Arab Spring and its collapse from 2010 to 2012; a refugee crisis in Europe that 
began around 2015; the Brexit referendum, which threw the European Union into 
turmoil in 2016; and the global pandemic and recession of 2020. These crises 
accompanied and contributed to deepening popular unhappiness with 
globalization and international governance, which in turn generated domestic 
political upheavals as nationalist, nativist, and populist movements made inroads 
on popular opinion. These movements took place both in entrenched liberal 
democracies like the U.S., the U.K., France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy, 
as well as in developing countries, like China, India, Brazil, and the Philippines, 
where the commitment to liberal democracy is shakier or non-existent. 
Meanwhile, the American-led international order has faced challenges from 
a rising China and a newly aggressive Russia. Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, 
China has suppressed democracy in Hong Kong, ratcheted up pressure on Taiwan 
and in the South China Sea, increased domestic repression, committed horrific 
abuses—against more than one million Uighurs in particular—and used its 
economic might to expand its influence in East and Central Asia, Europe, and 
Africa through the Belt and Road infrastructure initiative. Russia under Vladimir 
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Putin has also increased domestic repression and put pressure on its neighboring 
countries by going to war in Georgia and Ukraine and using covert operations to 
interfere with elections and government operations in the U.S. and other 
countries. 
These upheavals have had an impact on international law. The U.S. under 
Trump upended the World Trade Organization (WTO) by gutting the appellate 
body and sparking a global trade war.48 It remains unclear which of these moves 
violate the WTO and which simply exploit its loopholes, but either way, the 
weakness of the regime has been revealed. Also revealed is the extent to which 
powerful nations will retreat from global trade rules that no longer serve their 
interests. It is noteworthy in this regard that the Biden administration has accepted 
the Trump administration’s basic critique of global trade rules and has announced 
that it will take a “different” approach to “free trade agreements” that will focus 
sharply on the interests of “American job[s]” and the “interests of all American 
workers.”49 
Whether conceived in terms of violations of international human rights 
treaties or the ostensible customary international law of human rights, the last 
fifteen years have witnessed a similarly broad retreat in respect for human rights. 
The supposedly developing international law right to democracy that was touted 
in the 1990s and early 2000s has been replaced since 2006 with fifteen straight 
years of decline in democratic freedoms.50 According to Freedom House, 
countries experiencing deterioration in democracy in 2020 “outnumbered those 
with improvements by the largest margin recorded since the negative trend began 
in 2006.” Freedom House concludes that “the long democratic recession is 
deepening.”51 
The U.N. Charter’s injunction to states to “refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state” has also taken a beating.52 To take only the most 
obvious examples: Russia invaded Georgia, annexed Crimea, and committed a 
number of assassinations in the West. China ceaselessly threatens Taiwan and 
asserts its territorial will in the South China Sea (in part through ignoring a ruling 
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by a tribunal constituted under the Law of the Sea treaty).53 The territorial integrity 
and political independence of many Middle Eastern nations—most notably 
Yemen and Syria—are regularly violated. Other examples include the great power 
fight for control of the U.N.-sanctioned destruction of Libya, the war between 
Ethiopia and the Tigray Region, and clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan 
over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. There have been many other 
cross-border conflicts in the last fifteen years. And perhaps most significantly, the 
U.S. has so broadly expanded the “self-defense” exception to the prohibition on 
the use of force in the last fifteen years that it now swallows the “rule.”54 
Limits did not predict these developments. But it did provide tools for 
understanding them. The book warned that international law that depended on 
the collective action of numerous states was fragile and devoted two chapters to 
explaining that the international trade and human rights systems were vulnerable 
for this reason. It also argued that when particular rules of international law stop 
reflecting the interests of powerful states—either as a result of shifts in power 
across states, or changing perceptions of national interest—violations will occur, 
and the law itself will change. That seems to be happening as China and Russia 
reassert their security interests, China gains power through economic growth, 
opponents of international economic cooperation obtain influence in various 
states, and governments rethink the value and limitations of human rights and free 
trade commitments in response to internal religious, security, and economic 
pressures. 
Mainstream public international law scholarship from the 1990s, which was 
oriented toward explaining the growth and spread of international law, is not in a 
strong position to explain its contraction. Many international law scholars have 
blamed the backlash against international law on populism. There is certainly 
evidence for this view—and for the view that the neo-liberal elements of 
international law contributed to this backlash. In many notable cases, a state’s 
refusal to comply with a legal norm can be traced to the demands of a domestic 
populist movement.55 But the question is what to make of this evidence. For 
traditional public international law scholars, the temptation is to see the backlash 
as the result of a temporary eruption of irrationality. Populism is not just normal 
politics but collective self-delusion that has no lasting effect. Or, at best, as 
political tactics—mere rhetoric—that will have no effect over the long term.56 On 
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this view, the solution is to preserve valuable international institutions while riding 
out the wave of populism until it crests.57 
By contrast, the view of Limits was that we should expect international law 
to change and even regress as power relations and the interests of states change. 
States’ interests, of course, must be determined through domestic political 
institutions, and populism characteristically arises when a substantial group of 
people believe that those institutions disregard their values and interests. That is 
what has happened as people in many western countries have lost confidence in 
their governments as a result of economic stagnation and other perceived political 
failures—including failures associated with international institutions like the 
WTO. Their distrust of their own governments and elites carries over to 
international institutions and elites as well. On this view, the backlash against 
international law is rational even if unfortunate.58 
We do not mean to suggest, and do not believe, that all of international law 
is in decline. A huge amount of (mostly unstudied, mostly bilateral) international 
law continues to foster cooperation and coordination in normal ways. Our point 
is that one cannot understand the massive changes in and non-compliance with 
major international law instruments alongside this persistent lower-level 
cooperation through the lens of traditional public international law scholarship. 
Another trend in the last fifteen years that Limits provides the tools to 
understand is the notable decline in the use of binding international instruments 
and a rise in the use of “non-binding” political commitments to foster 
international cooperation. This is true for large-scale, ambitious international 
efforts, such as the Iran deal and components of the Paris Agreements, and for 
less ambitious forms of regulatory cooperation. Political commitments are a 
puzzle for traditional international law scholarship because they lack the fairy dust 
of “legal obligation” that supposedly induces compliance. But they are not a 
puzzle for Limits. Indeed, the book began its explanation of binding international 
agreements with an explanation of why states used non-binding political 
commitments so often and how they succeed.59 
The basic answer is that non-legal agreements can set the terms for (and thus 
help achieve) self-enforcing coordination of cooperation among nations without 
ratification and legal obligation. For us, the puzzle was not how are political 
commitments possible, but rather: “If states can cooperate using nonlegal 
instruments, why do they ever enter into treaties governed by international law?”60 
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We outlined three possibilities: (1) domestic ratification processes that attend 
binding agreements convey important information about state preferences for the 
agreement; (2) binding agreements implicate certain interpretive default rules; and 
(3) binding agreements by convention signal a more serious commitment than 
nonlegal agreements. We doubt that these three explanations are exhaustive. The 
point is that any theory of international law must explain how cooperation via 
non-binding instruments works and must have an account of what, if anything, 
legalization adds. 
VI.  CONCLUSION  
International law scholarship, even more than international law, seems to be 
at a turning point. The field appears to be bifurcating. One branch has fallen back 
on traditional doctrinal scholarship, still cosmopolitan and liberal/progressive, but 
with a chastened tone. The other branch is devoted to quantitative empiricism and 
is beginning to inform questions of treaty design. Old habits die hard, but we put 
our money on the second branch producing more wisdom than the first. 
